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PEOPLE BEFORE PROFITS: PURSUING 
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
LABOR RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ABROAD 
THROUGH THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT 
DOUGLAS S. MORRIN* 
CORPORATE PREDATORS: THE HUNT FOR MEGA-PROFITS AND 
THE ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY By RUSSELL MOKHIBER & ROBERT 
WEISSMAN. Monroe, Maine: Common Courage. 1999. Pp. 213. 
In their book, Corporate Predators: The Hunt For Mega-Profits and 
The Attack on Democracy, Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman ex-
pose the pervasiveness of rights violations committed fry corporations both 
domestically and abroad. However, while the authors alert their readers to 
and educate them about the dangers of globalization, they fail to provide 
many clear solutions. Fortunately, evidence suggests that the United States 
judicial system is already being used to pursue corporate accountability in 
the global marketplace. The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), adopted fry the 
first Congress in the Judiciary Ad of 1789, provides foreigners who suffer 
human rights injuries outside the United States a federal forum through 
which to pursue their claim. Recently, decisions have extended the ATCA's 
jurisdiction into the realm of labor rights as well. Through an analysis of 
the ATCA's case law, the current lawsuit filed against eighteen United 
States clothing designers and manufacturers for labor violations in Saipan 
factories can be better examined. In turn, this analysis will show how the 
ATCA, while not yet a panacea for the ills of the global economy, has become 
an increasingly powerful tool in promoting corporate accountability abroad. 
Transnational corporations (TNCs) wield extraordinary power 
and influence in today's global economy.1 In fact, approximately half 
of the top 100 economies in the world now belong to corporations, 
not countries.2 The ability to export substantial capital has provided 
these corporations with major leverage against local, state, and federal 
officials, both domestically and abroad.3 Many national and state poli-
ticians, unwilling to risk further factory relocation overseas, offer sub-
* Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL (1999-2000). 
1 See generally RUSSELL MOKHIBER & ROBERT \'VEISSMAN, CORPORATE PREDATORS: THE 
HUNT FOR MEGA-PROFITS AND THE ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY (1999). 
2 See Carp(ffate vs. Country Economic Clout: The Top 100, NATION, Dec. 6, 1999, at 25. 
3 See generally MOKHIBER & WEISSMAN, supra note 1. 
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stantial tax incentives to TNCs to remain in the United States.4 Simi-
larly, many of these same politicians are also fearful of inhibiting cor-
porate profitability and, in turn, hurting the national economy 
through greater regulation of TNCs abroad.5 Thus, political attempts 
for corporate accountability have largely failed due to the dominant 
bargaining position of TNCs. 
As a result of increased economic globalization, transnational 
corporations are largely able to avoid accountability abroad as well. 
Developing governments have persuaded TNCs to relocate factories 
into their countries by offering lower environmental and labor stan-
dards.6 Transnational corporations have enjoyed greater profitability 
through the decreased production costs that exist in such countries.7 
However, this private profitability has come at great societal cost. 
Transnational corporations often possess tremendous economic val-
ues that rival those of the developing countries in which they establish 
their factories.s In turn, these governments are willing to ignore viola-
tions of human rights, labor rights, and environmental rights as a 
means of attracting needed jobs and improving economic conditions 
in their developing countries.9 For example, though reports of sweat-
.4 See MARK ZEPEZAUER & ARTHUR NAIMAN, TAKE THE RICH OFF WELFARE 115-16 
(1996). 
. 5 See Sarah Anderson et aI., Ten Myths About Gwbalization, NATION, Dec. 6, 1999, at 26--
27; see generally David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing 
Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE]. INT'L L. 129 (1999). An example of the 
U.S. government's reluctance to inhibit corporate freedom is its recent ratification of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). See id. at 166--68. While the 
United States government ratified the ICCPR, which prohibited slavery, indentured servi-
tude, and forced labor, it declared that the covenant's terms were not "self-executing." See 
id. at 166; Sarah H. Cleveland, Gwbal Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 76 TEX. L. 
REv. 1533, 1573 n.200 (1998) (reviewing HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996». In so doing, the 
United States has exempted itself and is not bound by the terms of the treaty. See Sloss, 
supra, at 166--68. 
6 See MOIiliIBER & WEISSMAN, supra note 1, at 68-70. 
7 See id. at 69. 
8 See id. at 167-68. An extreme example of a corporation's economic dominance over 
a developing country is the Walt Disney Company's relationship with Haiti. See id. at 168. 
Disney outsources production of Disney clothing and toys to factories in Haiti, as well as 
Burma, Vietnam, and China. See id. According to the Disney Corporation'S 1998 Annual 
Report, the company's total assets for that year were over $41 billion. See The Walt Disney 
Company, 1998 Annual Report: Selected Financial Data (visited May 15, 2000) <http:/ / dis-
ney.go.com/investors/index.html>. Conversely, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 
Haiti was merely $8.9 billion during that same time. See Central Intelligence Agency, The 
World Factbook 1999 (visited May 15, 2000) <http://www.cia.gov / cia/publications/ 
factbook/ha.html#econ> . 
9 See MOKHIBER & WEISSMAN, supra note 1, at 68-70. 
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shop conditions in garment factories are commonplace, the number 
of prosecutions of such abuses by developing governments is negligi-
ble.10 In fact, developing governments themselves frequently have 
been accused of committing violations for the benefit ofTNCs.ll 
Transnational corporations have denied responsibility for such 
abuses, claiming they are simply providing needed jobs to developing 
regions.12 Many TNCs, especially ones that rely on consumer name 
recognition, have established "codes of conduct" for their foreign fac-
tories in response to growing media reports of systematic rights viola-
tions.13 However, while these codes of conduct may seem impressive, 
they have been largely ineffective at realizing the goals they purport 
to pursue.14 When one considers the U.S. government's reluctance to 
regulate TNCs coupled with developing. nations' perpetuation of 
rights violations, it is apparent that transnational corporations have 
enjoyed their increased profitability at the expense of workers and 
have done so with relative impunity. 
In their book, Corporate Predators: The Hunt For Mega-Profits and 
The Attack on Democracy, Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman ex-
pose the pervasiveness of rights violations committed by corporations 
both domestically and abroad.15 Alternating between depictions of 
corporate support of rights violations abroad and government ap-
peasement of TNCs, Mokhiber and Weissman show ho",: democracy 
10 See Global Survival Network, Trapped: Human Trafficking fur Furced Labur in the Com-· 
monwealth of the Nurthern Mariana Islands (a l];S. Territury) (visited May 15, 2000) <http:/ / 
www.globalsurvival.net/projects/cnmi/9905cnmi.html> [hereinafter Trapped Repurt]. 
Many garment factories in Saipan block walkways and emergency exits to restrict the 
movement of workers, in complete disregard of federal safety codes. See id. Similarly, in 
NIKE's Vietnam factories, workers are reportedly required to work overtime, each in ex-
cess of 500 hours per year. See Lena Ayoub, Nike Just Does It-and M-7zy the United States 
Shouldn't: The United States' International Obligation to Hold MNCs Accountable fur Their Labur 
Rights Violations Abroad, 11 DEPAUL Bus. LJ. 395, 409 (1999). This requirement is in direct 
violation of Vietnamese labor law, which sets maximum overtime at 200 hours per year. See 
id. In both cases, these violations have been consistently ignored by the foreign govern-
ments. See id. 
11 See generally Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997) (al-
leging Indonesian military personnel, paid by Freeport, committed various human rights 
abuses, including murder, torture and "cultural genocide"), aff'd 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 
1999); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (alleging Myanmar gov-
ernment used citizens as forced labor in the building of Yadana gas pipeline financed by 
Unocal). 
12 See Anderson et aI., supra note 5, at 26-27. 
13 See MOKHIBER & WEISSMAN, supra note 1, at 171-72. 
14 See id. at 84; Ayoub, supra note 10, at 411. 
15 See generally MOKHIBER & WEISSMAN, supra note 1. 
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has been threatened by greater corporate profitability.l6 Through 
their reports, the authors attempt to compel citizen activism against 
corporate misconduct. I7 
However, while Mokhiber and Weissman alert their readers to 
and educate them about the dangers of globalization, they fail to pro-
vide many clear solutions. IS Readers are left to question how "this 
march toward Corporate Feudalism can be legally stopped."19 Fortu-
nately, evidence suggests that the United States judicial system is al-
ready being used to pursue corporate accountability in the global 
marketplace.2o The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) , adopted by the 
first Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789, provides foreigners who 
suffer human rights injuries outside the United States a federal forum 
through which to pursue their claim.21 Recently, cases have been 
brought against American corporations in an effort to extend the 
ATCA's jurisdiction to labor rights as well.22 
Part I of this Book Review provides an overview of the Alien Tort 
Claims Act as a basis for litigating human rights violations and the 
formidable hurdles that plaintiffs face before they can successfully 
invoke the statute. Part II examines the recent extension of the ATCA 
to international labor violations, focusing on the two suits that estab-
lished this trend, National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma v. 
Unocal, Inc. and Doe v. Unocal Corp. Finally, Part III highlights a recent 
lawsuit filed in federal court against eighteen garment manufacturers 
for labor violations in Saipan factories and posits the lawsuit's likeli-
hood of successfully surviving dismissal. This Book Review concludes 
that the ATCA, while not yet a panacea for the ills of the global econ-
omy, has become an increasingly powerful tool in promoting corpo-
rate accountability abroad. 
16 See grmerally id. 
17 See Ralph Nader, Introduction to MOKHIBER & WEISSMAN, supra note 1. 
18 See grmerally MOKHIBER & WEISSMAN, supra note 1. 
19 Charles Reid, Reviews of Corporate Predators (visited May 15, 2000) <http://www. cor-
poratepredators.org/reviews.html> . 
20 SeeJota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 1998); National Coalition Gov't of 
the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 334-35 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Beanal v. 
Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362,366 (E.D. La. 1997), afJ'd, 197 F.3d 161 (5th 
Cir. 1999); Doev. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880,883-84 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
21 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1997). 
22 Seelwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424,438-39 (D.NJ. 1999); National 
Coalition Gov't, 176 F.R.D. at 349; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892. 
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The Alien Tort Claims Act grants federal courts jurisdiction over 
"any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. "23 Thus, federal ju-
risdiction is seemingly established for claims brought (1) by an alien, 
(2) alleging a tort, (3) in violation of a United States treaty or the law 
of nations.24 However, plaintiffs face numerous and significant hur-
dles in successfully obtaining jurisdiction through the ATCA.25 
As the statute implies, not all torts are within the jurisdictional 
grant of the ATCA.26 Rather, only torts in violation of a United States 
treaty or the law of nations can be successfully brought under the 
ATCA.27 The federal courts apply a stringent threshold standard in 
determining whether the conduct alleged satisfies this requirement.28 
To determine whether a particular tort is a violation of the law of na-
tions, courts examine contemporary internationallaw.29 The norms of 
contemporary international law are determined by "consulting the 
works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general 
usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and, 
enforcing that law. "30 In addition, such rules must command the 
"general assent of civilized nations" to become binding as contempo-
rary international law and, thus, as the law of nations.3! This require-
ment of international consensus has established a high threshold by 
which causes of action are judged.32 The federal courts established 
such a high threshold to prevent nations from imposing their own 
ideological standards upon other countries, in the guise of applying 
23 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
24 See id. 
25 See Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 114 (5th Cir. 1988); Tel-Oren v. 
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards,]., concurring); lIT v. 
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975); Beana~ 969 F. Supp. at 380. 
26 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
27 See id. 
28 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 
876,880 (2d Cir. 1980); Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 370. 
29 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. The court reasoned that international law is not static 
and, thus, must be interpreted "not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among 
the nations of the world today." See id. 
30 Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 238; Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880; see Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 370. 
31 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. 
32 See id. at 888. 
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international law.33 Due to this stringent standard, a violation of the 
law of nations occurs only when the defendant's alleged conduct vio-
lates "well-established, universally recognized norms of international 
law," as opposed to merely the "idiosyncratic legal rules" of certain 
nations.34 
As a result of the requirement for international consensus, only a 
limited number of claims have been held by courts to constitute a vio-
lation of the law of nations.35 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States provides a list of claims that, at a mini-
mum, constitute such violations.36 According to Section 702 of the 
Restatement, a state violates international law if it practices, encour-
ages, or condones, genocide, slavery or slave trade, murder or causing 
the disappearance of individuals, torture or other cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention, 
systematic racial discrimination, or a consistent pattern of gross viola-
tions of internationally recognized human rights.37 Conversely, nu-
merous other claims, while certainly compelling, have failed to meet 
the strict standards of international consensus.38 Courts have been 
unwilling to extend ATCA jurisdiction to claims of fraud, conversion, 
negligence, wrongful death, child custody, and libel based on the 
idiosyncratic nature of the claims.39 Many environmental claims have 
33 See id. at 881; see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 u.s. 398, 428-30 
(1964) (declining to adjudge the validity of the Cuban government's expropriation of a 
foreign-<>wned corporation's assets, the Supreme Court noted sharply conflicting views on 
the issue propounded by communist and capitalist nations). 
34 See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 239. 
35 See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 242 (genocide); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890 (official torture); 
Eastman Kodak v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1092 (S.D, Fla. 1997) (prolonged arbitrary 
detention); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (forced labor 
as a form of slave trade); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 711 (N.D. Cal. 1988) 
(disappearance). Compare Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 187 (D. Mass. 1995) (hold-
ing cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment a violation of the law of na-
tions and actionable under ATCA); withForti, 694 F. Supp. at 712 (holding cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment or punishment an insufficient claim under ATCA due to lack of 
consensus as to its definition or parameters). 
36 See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 240; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw 
§ 702 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT J. 
37 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, at § 702. 
38 See Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir, 1995) (fraud); Huynh 
Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978) (child custody); Benjamins v. British 
European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir, 1978) (negligence and wrongful death); lIT 
v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (conversion); Akbar v. New York Maga-
zine Co., 490 F. Supp. 60, 63 (D.D.C. 1980) (libel). 
39 See Hamid, 51 F.3d at 1418; Huynh Thi Anh, 586 F.2d at 629; Benjamins, 572 F.2d at 
916; Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1015; Akbar, 490 F. Supp. at 63. 
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also faced intense scrutiny by the courts due to their similar lack of 
international consensus.4O 
However, although the text of the ATCA merely requires that an 
alien allege a tort in violation of the law of nations, not all of these 
violations can actually be brought under the statute.41 Courts have 
additionally required that such violations be "definable" and contain 
"obligatory, rather than hortatory" language.42 Thus, not only must 
there be international consensus that a particular claim is a violation 
of the law of nations, but there must also be global assent as to the 
elements of that claim.43 Unfortunately for plaintiffs, proving interna-
tional consensus as to a definable tort may still not be enough to ob-
tain jurisdiction under the ATCA. 
In addition to demonstrating a definable violation of the law of 
nations, most plaintiffs are also required to prove the existence of 
state action.44 Although this state action requirement is absent from 
the text of the ATCA, most courts have held that customary interna-
tional law itself imposes such a requirement.45 In Tel-Oren v. Libyan 
Arab Republic, Judge Harry Edwards noted that the law of nations tra-
ditionally has been defined as "the body of rules and principles of ac-
tion which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with one 
another."46 The inherent state action requirement of the ATCA has 
led most courts to refuse jurisdiction in cases absent such action, even 
where a clear violation of the law of nations has been alleged.47 Con-
40 See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 382 (E.D. La. 1997), a/I'd, 
197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 671 
(S.D.N.Y 1991). 
41 See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 370; Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Mass. 
1995); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1988). 
42 See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 370; Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 184; Forti, 694 F. Supp. at 709. 
4$ See generally Farti, 694 F. Supp. 707. In Farti, the court noted that "disappearance" was 
a universally recognized violation of the law of nations. See id. at 710. In addition, there was 
a universal and obligatory international proscription of the elements of the tort. See id. at 
711. Thus, the plaintiffs claim of disappearance established jurisdiction under the ATCA. 
Conversely, the court did not find any universal assent to the terms of "cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment," and dismissed this latter claim. See id. at 712. 
44 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1984); National 
Coalition Gov't v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 345 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Beana~ 969 F. Supp. at 
373; Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 890 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
45 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 792. 
46 [d. at 792 n.22. (citing J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF PEACE 1 (6th ed. 1963». 
47 See, e.g., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 792 (finding that, while torture is a violation of the law 
of nations, no jurisdiction exists under the ATCA due to lack of state action); Beana~ 969 F. 
Supp. at 371 (holding claims of murder and torture not actionable under ATCA due to 
lack of state action); see also National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.R.D. at 348 (finding jurisdiction 
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sequently, this requirement has greatly limited the feasibility of the 
ATCA for claims against private individuals.48 
Nonetheless, private individuals are not completely immune from 
the jurisdiction of the ATCA.49 The state action requirement can be 
satisfied where a private individual acts under the color of law.5o To 
determine whether this standard is satisfied, courts use the jurispru-
dence developed under 42 u.S.C. § 1983 as a relevant guide.51 Under 
th~ ATCA, four approaches have been used in determining the color 
of law question: public function, symbiotic relationship, nexus, and 
joint action.52 To date, only the joint action test has successfully found 
state action by a private defendant.53 Under the joint action test, state 
action will exist ''where there is a 'substantial degree of cooperative 
established under ATCA for torture due to presence of state action); Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 
891 (finding jurisdiction established under ATCA for torture due to presence of state ac-
tion). 
48 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 792; Beana~ 969 F.Supp. at 371. 
49 SeeKadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995); National Coalition Goo't, 176 
F.RD. at 348; Beana~ 969 F. Supp. at 374; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891-92. 
50 See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 245; National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.RD. at 348; Beana~ 969 F. 
Supp. at 374; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891-92. 
51 See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 245; National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.RD. at 344; Beana~ 969 F. 
Supp. at 374; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 890. 
52 Under the public function approach, state action can exist where a private entity 
performs a function traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State. See Beana~ 969 F. 
Supp. at 379 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974». 
Under the symbiotic relationship approach, state action can be established where the 
state "has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence" with a private party 
that "it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity." See Beana~ 969 
F. Supp. at 378 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961». To 
establish a symbiotic relationship, the state and the private entity must be "physically and 
financially integral." See itl. 
Under the nexus test, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there is a sufficiently close 
nexus between the government and the challenged conduct such that the conduct may 
fairly be treated as that of the state itself. See Beana~ 969 F. Supp. at 377 (citing Gallagher v. 
Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1448 (10th Gir. 1995». To satisfy this test, the 
state must be significantly involved in or actually participate in the alleged conduct. See itl. 
"Under the joint action approach, private actors can be state actors if they are 'willful 
participant[s] in joint action with the state or its agents.'" Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 890 (citing 
Dennisv. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980». 
53 See National Coalition Gov't v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.RD. 329, 348 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (al-
leging defendant corporation to be joint venturers with state officials in forced labor and 
other human rights violations in furtherance of joint gas pipeline project); Doe, 963 F. 
Supp. at 891 (alleging defendant corporation to be joint venturers with state officials in 
forced labor and other human rights violations in furtherance of joint gas pipeline proj-
ect). 
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.action' between the private and state actors in effecting the depriva-
tion of rights .... "54 
In limited circumstances, courts have held that private individu-
als may be liable for violations of the law of nations even absent state 
action.55 An exception to the state action requirement is provided for 
those violations that rise to the level of "universal concern. "56 As a re-
sult, certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether un-
dertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as pri-
vate individuals.57 However, courts have been unwilling to read this 
exception expansively absent guidance from the Supreme Court. 58 To 
date, only piracy, slave trade, genocide, war .crimes, and attacks on or 
hijacking of aircraft have been considered undisputed violations of 
universal concern. 59 
In addition, private individuals need not be directly engaged in 
such violations to be exposed to liability.60 Rather, private individuals 
may be held liable merely where they knowingly benefit from a viola-
tion of universal concern by a third party.61 Thus, the ATCA, notwith-
standing its substantive hurdles, can still provide a powerful weapon 
against private misconduct abroad. 
Even after successfully establishing jurisdiction under the ATCA, 
many plaintiffs face a formidable procedural hurdle in surviving dis-
missal. 62 Defendants routinely move to dismiss an ATCA claim 
54 Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891 (citing Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 
1442,1453 (10th Cir. 1995». 
55 SeeKadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995), Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Re-
public, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984); National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.R.D. at 348; Doe, 
963 F. Supp. at 891. 
56 See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 240; Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795; Beana~:969 F. Supp. at 371. In 
his concurring opinion, Judge Harry Edwards noted that the requirement of state action 
did not always exist. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 794 (Edwards,J., concurring). Rather, in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, writers and jurists believed that rules of inter-
national law implicitly bound individuals as well as states. See id. In the nineteenth century, 
the view that states alone were subjects of international law became firmly entrenched in 
doctrine and practice. See id. . 
57 See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 239; TelrOren, 726 F.2d at 795; National Coalition Gov't, 176 
F.RD. at 349; Beana~ 969 F. Supp. at 371; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892. 
58 See TelrOren, 726 F.2d at 795. 
59 See RESTATEMENT, sUfrra note 36, at § 404. 
60 See National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.RD. at 349; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892. 
61 See National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.RD. at 349; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892. 
62 SeeJota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 158-59 (2d Cir. 1998); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 
F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1087 (S.D. 
Fla. 1997); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1198-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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through the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens.63 Under 
this doctrine, the court determines the location for trial that would be 
most convenient and best able to serve the ends ofjustice.64 
In making this determination, the court first must ascertain 
whether an adequate alternative forum exists.65 In many cases, defen-
dants prefer a foreign forum due to the probability of a more favor-
able outcome.66 Many foreign courts, especially in developing coun-
tries, are ill-equipped to handle such cumbersome cases, and some 
have a reputation for corruption.67 Accordingly, the court's initial de-
termination will largely depend upon the stability of the foreign na-
tion's judiciary.68 
If the court finds that an adequate alternative forum exists, it will 
then balance a number of public and private interests to determine 
whether the convenience to the parties and the ends of justice would 
be served by dismissing the action.69 The public interest factors to be 
considered include "administrative difficulties stemming from court 
congestion; the interest in having 'localized controversies decided at 
home;' and the interest in having issues of foreign law decided by a 
foreign tribunal. "70 
In most cases, these factors should weigh in favor of the plaintiff. 
Congress enacted the ATCA specifically to "provide a federal forum 
63 Seejota, 157 F.3d at 158-59; Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 250; Eastman Kodak, 978 F. Supp. at 
1087; CalJiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1198-99. 
64 Seejota, 157 F.3d at 159; Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 250; CalJiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1198. 
65 Seejota, 157 F.3d at 158-59; Eastman K1xlak, 978 F. Supp. at 1083; CalJiri, 921 F. Supp. 
at 1199. 
66 For example, discovery rules are much weaker in many foreign courts. See generally 
Eyal Press, Texaco on Trial, NATION, May 31, 1999, at 11. In Ecuador, judges almost never 
compel witnesses to testify and require all questions to be submitted in writing. See id. at 15. 
Moreover, if a party wishes to withhold any subpoenaed documents from the court, it can 
do so and simply pay a $180 fine. See id. 
67 If the district court accepts the forum non conveniens argument on remand from jota, 
the case would be dismissed from the Southern District of New York. See Press, supra note 
66, at 13, 15. The alternative forum in Ecuador is a "small office on the third floor of a 
brown cinderblock building ... that ... has one computer, no fax machine, no Internet 
connection and no law clerks to assist with paperwork." See id. at 13. Moreover, in a recent 
poll conducted by George Washington University, only 16% of Ecuadorians expressed 
confidence in their judiciary. See id. at 12. 
68 See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 250 (finding that courts of the former Yugoslavia, either in 
Serbia or war-torn Bosnia, are unavailable to entertain plaintiff's claims); Eastman K1xlak, 
978 F. Supp. at 1085-86 (finding that proof of corruption in Bolivian justice system pre-
cluded dismissal of action on grounds of forum non conveniens). 
69 Seejota, 157 F.3d at 159; Eastman Kodak, 978 F. Supp. at 1083; CalJiri, 921 F. Supp. at 
1199. 
70 See CalJiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1199. 
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for aliens suing domestic entities for violation of the law of nations. "71 
Since an ATCA claim is brought pursuant to United States case law 
and statutes, federal courts are interested in having the issues of law 
decided by a U.S. court.72 Moreover, the judiciaries of developing 
countries, where many ATCA violations originate, would be substan-
tially overburdened by the additional caseload.73 
The private interests to be weighed by the court require fact-
specific determinations. These interests include "the ease of access to 
sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of 
unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; 
... and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, ex-
peditious and inexpensive. "74 As a result, determinations will be based 
primarily on the location of necessary documents and witnesses, the 
possible costs of translation, and safety considerations of the parties.75 
However, while the court balances the public and private interests 
of the litigants, the plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to a strong 
presumption of suitability.76 Unless this balance is strongly in favor of 
the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be dis-
turbed.77 . 
Due to the pervasiveness of rights violations committed by TNCs, 
the ATCA is increasingly being used by plaintiffs as a tool for corpo-
rate accountability. The Alien Tort Claims Act provides foreign plain-
tiffs with a federal forum to bring claims against private individuals, 
such as U.S. corporations. As the international norms of the law of 
nations continue to evolve and expand outside of traditional human 
rights, this tool should become even more helpful. 
II. THE EXTENSION OF JURISDICTION UNDER THE ATCA TO 
INTERNATIONAL LABOR VIOLATIONS 
Until the Second Circuit's decision in Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, the 
ATCA had rarely been used as a basis for jurisdiction in federal 
71 SeeJota, 157 F.3d at 159; Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 790 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980); Cabiri, 921 F. Supp;' at 
1199. 
72 See Cabiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1199. 
73 See Press, supra note 66, at 13. 
74 Cabin, 921 F. Supp. at 1199 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 
(1947». 
75 See Easunan Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1083-84 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Cab-
iri, 921 F. Supp. at 1199. 
76 See Eastman Kodak, 978 F. Supp. at 1083; Cabin, 921 F. Supp. at 1199. 
77 See Eastman Kodak, 978 F. Supp. at 1083; Cabiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1199. 
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court.78 By validating a Paraguayan citizen's claim of torture under the 
ATCA, the Second Circuit established the modern framework for de-
termining jurisdiction under the statute.79 Since Filartiga, courts have 
been reluctant to extend this framework beyond a limited number of 
human rights violations.8o However, this trend may be changing; a 
number of decisions have recently extended jurisdiction under the 
ATCA to international labor violations by a private defendant.sl 
In National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma v. Unoca~ 
Inc. and Doe v. Unocal Carp., Burmese citizens, the Federation of Trade 
Unions of Burma, and the exiled National Coalition Government of 
the Union of Burma brought actions against Unocal Corporation for 
human rights and labor violations committed by the reigning gov-
ernment of Myanmar (formerly Burma) in the construction of the 
Yadana natural gas pipeline.82 This pipeline was a joint venture be-
tween Unocal and the current Myanmar government, better known as 
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).83 
According to the plaintiffs, SLORC destroyed numerous villages 
in the pipeline region, burning homes and forcing people to flee; at 
the same time, it also engaged in the assault, rape, and torture of vil-
lagers.84 Moreover, SLORC used threats of death to compel thousands 
of villagers to travel to forced labor camps, carry food and tools for 
railroad construction, and serve as porters for the military in the 
pipeline region.85 Likewise, SLORC used forced labor to move mili-
tary battalions into the pipeline region, clear forests, construct a road 
alongside the route of the pipeline, and build other infrastructure 
78 See 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980). 
79 See generally id. 
80 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
81 See National Coalition Gov't v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329,349 (C.D. Cal. 1997); 
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
82 See National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.RD. at 334; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883. The two cases 
are separate, but related, actions against Unocal. In Doe, the plaintiffs are farmers from the 
Tenasserim region in Burma who were abused and forced into labor by the government. 
See Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883. In National Coalition Gov't, the plaintiffs are the exiled govern-
ment, a Burmese labor organization, and four Burmese citizens alleging torture, expro-
priation of property, and forced labor. See National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.RD. at 335. Both 
cases involve similar allegations by the individual plaintiffs and both were decided by the 
same judge. See National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.R.D. at 334-35; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883-84. 
Although the decisions are nearly identical, the two cases were not consolidated and, thus, 
were decided separately. See National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.RD. at 334-35; Doe, 963 F. Supp. 
at 883-84. 
8S See National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.RD. at 335-36; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 885. 
84 See National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.RD. at 336; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 885. 
M See National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.RD. at 336; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 885. 
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related to the pipeline.86 The plaintiffs alleged that Unocal was aware 
of and benefited from the use of this forced labor to support the 
Yadana gas pipeline project.87 
The district court rejected Unocal's motions to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, finding that jurisdiction existed under the 
ATCA for the plaintiffs' claims of torture and forced labor against the 
oil company.88 In applying the framework provided by Filartiga and its 
progeny, the court determined that federal jurisdiction was appropri-
ate since the claims were brought by aliens alleging a tort in violation 
of the law of nations.89 First, the individual plaintiffs, Burmese citi-
zens, were clearly aliens for purposes of the statute.90 Moreover, the 
court, while handling the claims of torture and forced labor differ-
ently, held both to be definable violations of the law of nations.91 In so 
deciding, the court established a foothold for the ATCA in the realm 
of international labor violations. 
Torture had already been firmly established as a violation of the 
law of nations through significant case law.92 However, since torture 
did not rise to the level of "universal concern," a finding of state ac-
tion was needed in order for the claim to be actionable under the 
ATCA.9!l The court determined that state action existed, as Unocal was 
"a willful participant in joint action" with SLORC or its agents.94 
Comments reportedly made by the president of Unocal, John Imle, 
limited any possibility for a different determination.95 
86 See National Coalition Cov't, 176 F.R.D. at 336; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 885. 
87 See National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.R.D. at 336; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 885. 
88 See National Coalition Cov't, 176 F.R.D. at 345; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883-84. The dis-
trict court, while holding that jurisdiction was available under the ATCA, found that the 
exiled government and the labor organization lacked standing to bring a claim under the 
ATCA. See National Coalition Cov't, 176 F.R.D. at 360. Thus, only the individual John Doe 
plaintiffs remained after the decision. See ill. at 360-61; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 897-98. 
89 See National Coalition Cov't, 176 F.R.D. at 349; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892; see generally Fi-
lartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). . 
90 See National Coalition Cov't, 176 F.R.D. at 344; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 890. , 
91 See National Coalition Cov't, 176 F.R.D. at 345, 348; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 890. In Na-
tional Coalition Cov't, some individual plaintiffs also brought claims alleging expropriation 
of property. See National Coalition Cov't, 176 F.R.D. at 345. The court noted that this claim 
was not recognized as a violation of the law of nations due to a lack of international con-
sensus. See id. Thus, the claim was not actionable under the ATCA. See id .. 
92 See National Coalition Cov't, 176 F.R.D. at 345; see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 
240 (2d Cir. 1995); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980). 
93 See National Coalition Cov't, 176 F.R.D. at 345-48; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 890-91. 
94 See National Coalition Cov't, 176 F.R.D. at 348; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891. 
95 See National Coalition Cov't, 176 F.R.D. at 348. Imle was quoted as stating to pipeline 
opponents: "What I'm saying is that if you threaten the pipeline, there's gonna be more 
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In examining the plaintiffs' forced labor claims, the court noted 
that Unocal would be held liable for violations of the law of nations 
even absent state action.96 The court equated forced labor to slave 
trading and held that, as such, the claim was "included in that 'hand-
ful of crimes' to which the law of nations attributes individual respon-
sibility .... "97 The court likened Uno cal to a slave owner because the 
corporation paid the Myanmar government to provide labor and se-
curity for the pipeline and "essentially treat[ed] SLORC as an over-
seer [that] accept[ed] the benefit of and approv[ed] the use offorced 
labor. "98 Moreover, since Unocal knowingly benefited from the forced 
labor, no showing of direct engagement in slave trading was needed 
by the plaintiffs.99 
While the plaintiffs faced the various substantive hurdles in estab-
lishing jurisdiction under the ATCA, a Jorum non conveniens argument 
was noticeably absent from the defendant's procedural arsenal.1oo 
However, this argument would have been highly unpersuasive if 
brought in the Unocal case. As an American corporation chartered in 
California, Unocal would have had great difficulty in claiming it was 
inconvenienced by the choice of forum in U.S. District Court-Central 
District of California.IOI Also, more importantly, it is unlikely that a 
fecteral court would have found an adequate alternative forum to ex-
ist in Myanmar.I02 There was no functioning judiciary in Myanmar; 
thus, the ends of justice would not have been served by dismissing the 
action under the doctrine ofJarum non conveniens. I03 
military. If forced labor goes hand in glove with the military, yes there will be more forced 
labor. For every threat to the pipeline, there will be a reaction." [d. 
96 See id.; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891. 
97 See National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.R.D. at 348; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891. It is interesting 
to note a slight change in wording between the two cases. In Doe, Judge Paez commented 
that the "allegations of forced labor in this case are sufficient to constitute an allegation of 
participation in slave trading." Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892 (emphasis added). However, ap-
proximately eight months later,Judge Paez wrote in National Coalition Gov't that the "alle-
gations of forced labor in this case may be sufficient to state a claim for participation in the 
slave trade." National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.R.D. at 349 (emphasis added). He noted in the 
latter case that "what constitutes 'slave trade,' however, has not been thoroughly delineated 
either by the courts listing it as a peremptory norm or by the parties in this action." Id. 
98 See National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.R.D. at 349; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892. 
99 See National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.R.D. at 349; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892. 
100 See generally National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.R.D. 329; Doe, 963 F. Supp. 880. 
101 See MOKHIBER & WEISSMAN, supra note 1, at 198-200. 
102 See Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 884. 
105 See id. The court provides a vivid example of Myanmar's inadequacy to serve the 
ends of justice. On May 27,1990, SLORe held multi-party elections in which the opposi-
tion party, the National League for Democracy, captured 82% of the parliamentary seats. 
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The two cases brought against Unocal, National Coalition Govern-
ment of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc. and Doe v. Unocal Corp., pro-
vided a more expansive reading of the ATCA than previous cases.104 In 
establishing jurisdiction under the statute, the court characterized 
forced labor as a modern form of slavery and the slave trade and, 
thus, a violation of universal concern. lOS Recently, another district 
court has supported this characterization of forced labor.106 In Iwon-
owa v. Ford Motor Company, the court found that the use of forced labor 
in the manufacturer's German factories during World War II violated 
established norms of customary international law.107 Through these 
decisions, the courts have helped to further restrict the boundaries by 
which corporations can lawfully place profits before people. 
III. THE SAIPAN CASE AND ITS LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS 
In the apparel industry, major clothing retailers clamor to obtain 
their garments from a small island in the South Pacific Ocean. lOS 
Saipan, the main island within the Commonwealth of Northern 
Mariana Islands (CNMI), is home to numerous garment manufactur-
ers and produces apparel for many top U.S. brands.loo In fact, the is-
land exports roughly one billion dollars worth of merchandise annu-
ally to the United States.no 
The island's substantial economic success is due mainly to the 
CNMI's unique relation to the United States.111 The Commonwealth 
enjoys United States territorial status, similar to Puerto Rico, and the 
indigenous people of the CNMI enjoy U.S. citizenship.ll2 Thus, as a 
territory, the CNMI can sell merchandise produced in the Common-
See id. SLORC promptly arrested the party's leaders and intensified its campaign of repres-
sion against the pro-democracy movement throughout the country. See id. Thus, one won-
ders how impartial any judge in Myanmar could be. 
104 See National Coalition Goo't, 176 F.R.D. at 360; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 884. 
105 See National Coalition Goo't, 176 F.R.D. at 348-49; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891-92. 
106 See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 445 (D.NJ. 1999). 
107 See id. Although the court in lwanowa held forced labor to be a violation of the law 
of nations, they ultimately dismissed the case on statute of limitations grounds. See id. at 
491. 
108 See Trapped Report, supra note 10. 
109 Seeid. 
110 See Sweatshap Watch: Swp Saipan Sweatshaps (visited May 15, 2000) <http://www. 
sweatshopwatch.org/ swatch/ marianas> [hereinafter Swp Saipan Sweatshaps]. 
III See Trapped Report, supra note 10. 
112 See id. In addition to U.S. citizenship, CNMI residents enjoy all other accompanying 
benefits such as Social Security, unemployment benefits, workers' compensation, welfare, 
etc. See id. However, the right to vote in federal elections is excepted from this grant. See id. 
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wealth duty-free in the United States.ll3 The United States govern-
ment neither taxes nor imposes quotas on the merchandise exported 
annually from the CNMI to the fifty states.1l4 
However, unlike other U.S. territories, the CNMI has retained 
control over immigration and naturalization policies and its minimum 
wage.115 Currently, the Commonwealth's minimum wage is approxi-
mately $3.05 per hour, more than $2.00 less than the federal rate.116 
Because of its low minimum wage and its exemption from U.S. import 
tariffs or quota restrictions, Saipan has attracted numerous garment 
manufacturers who, in turn, produce clothes for some of the biggest 
U.S. labels.ll7 Similarly, major clothing retailers have been attracted to 
the Saipan manufacturers by the substantial savings the manufactur-
ers offer due to their low production costs.ll8 
While both U.S. retailers and Saipan garment manufacturers 
have profited from this arrangement, the garment workers themselves 
largely have been exploited.119 Amazingly, over ninety percent of 
garment industry jobs in the CNMI are held by foreign "guest work-
ers," predominately young women from China, the Philippines, Bang-
ladesh, and Thailand.120 The vast majority of these workers are re-
cruited by private agencies advertising well-paying jobs in the United 
States.12l With promises of high pay and quality work in the United 
States, workers agree to repay recruitment fees ranging from $2,000 
to $7,000 and thus become trapped in a state of indentured servi-
tude.122 Since workers often cannot pay the recruitment cost up front, 
they agree to work off the debt through labor.123 As a result, the work-
ers end up in a form of bondage from which most of them cannot 
113 Seeid. 
114 See id. 
115 See id. 
116 See Trapped Report, supra note 10. 
117 See Stop Saipan Sweatshops, supra note 110. 
118 See Trapped Report, supra note 10. 
119 See id. 
120 See Stop Saipan Sweatshops, supra note 110. 
121 See Sweatshop Watch: Saipan Sweatshop Litigation (visited May 15, 2000) <http:www. 
sweatshopwatch.org/ swatch/marianas/ complaint.htm> [hereinafter State Complaint]. 
These recruiters advertise well-paying jobs in the U.S. by using such misrepresentations as 
Saipan only being "a short train ride" from Los Angeles to lure impoverished men and 
women living in severely underdeveloped nations. See id. 
122 See Stop Saipan Sweatshops, supra note 110. 
123 See Trapped Report, supra note 10. 
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escape.124 In addition, the working and living conditions imposed on 
garment workers are deplorable.125 
On January 13, 1999, afederaI class action lawsuit was filed in Los 
Angeles on behalf of more than 50,000 workers from China, the Phil-
ippines, Bangladesh, and Thailand against eighteen high-profile U.S. 
clothing retailers, including The Gap, Tommy Hilfiger, Sears, Wal-
Mart, andJ.Crew.126 The plaintiffs brought this action under the Alien 
Torts Claim Act, alleging human rights and international labor viola-
tions committed by garment manufacturers in Saipan factories. 127 The 
plaintiffs claim that these companies have conspired to place thou-
124 See id. Among workers, "payless paydays" is a familiar phrase as debt repayments, 
coupled with other essential expenses, leave them with nothing. See id. Many workers com-
plain of not getting paid at all. See id. 
125 See Steven Greenhouse, Suit Says 18 Companies Conspired to Violate Sweatshop Workers' 
Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1999, at A9; William Carlsen, Sweatshop Conditions Alleged on 
U.S. Island, S.F. CHRoN.,Jan. 14, 1999, at AI; William Branigin, Top Clothing Retailers Labeled 
Labor Abusers; Sweatshops Allegedly Run on U.S. Territory, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1999, at A14; 
Lorrie Grant, "Sweatshop" Lawsuit Seeks $IB From Retailers, USA TODAY, Jan. 14, 1999, at 3B. 
The lawsuit paints a grim picture of the sweatshops in Saipan. The complaint states that: 
workers, predominately female, often must work 12 hours a day, seven days a week, and 
sometimes for free if they fall behind on their quotas. See Carlsen, supra, at AI. These 
workers live seven to a room in barracks that are surrounded by inward-facing barbed wire. 
See Greenhouse, supra, at A9. Bathroom breaks are limited and exits are sometimes locked. 
See id. In order to remain productive, the complaint asserts, some companies force preg-
nant women to have abortions. See id. 
126 The complete list of defendants is as follows: The Gap (which owns Banana Repub-
lic and Old Navy); Cutter & Buck, Inc.; Dayton-Hudson Corp. (which owns Target, Mer-
vyn's, and Marshall Fields); J.Crew; J.C. Penny; Nordstrom; Sears; The Limited; OshKosh 
B'Gosh; Jones Apparel Group; The Gymboree Corp.; The Associated Merchandising 
Corp.; The May Department Stores Company (which owns Famous-Barr, Filene's, Foley'S, 
Hecht's, The Jones Store, Kaufmann's, Lord & Taylor, L.S. Ayres, Meier & Frank, Robin-
son's May, and Strawbridges); The Dress Barn; Lane Bryant; Wal-Mart; Tommy Hilfiger; 
and Warnaco Group. See Sweatshop Watch: Lawsuits Charge Sweatshop Conspiracy on Marianas 
(visited May 15, 2000) <http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/marianas/lawsuit. 
html>. As of March 28, 2000, 17 retailers had settled the lawsuit. See Sweatshop Wa(ch: Re-
tailers Agree to Settlement (visited May 15, 2000) <http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/ 
swatch/marianas/settlement.html#march28>. On March 3, 2000, Levi Strauss & Co., Cal-
vin Klein Inc., Brooks Brothers Inc., Abercrombie & Fitch Co., The Talbots Inc. and Wool-
rich Inc. were added to the lawsuit. See Managers & Managing: Sweatshop Case Expands to 
Include More U.S. Firms, WALL ST.]. EUR., Mar. 6, 2000, available in 2000 WL-WSJE 2947048. 
127 See Greenhouse, supra note 125, at A9; Carlsen, supra note 125, at AI; Branigin, su-
pra note 125, at A14; Grant, supra note 125, at 3B. The plaintiffs also brought claims under 
the federal RICO statute. See Greenhouse, supra note 125, at A9. In addition, two compan-
ion cases in federal and state court alleged unfair business practices in violation of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act and California law. See id. However, for purposes of this book review, 
the analysis will only focus on the ATCA claim. 
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sands of workers in involuntary servitude and knowingly benefit from 
this form of forced labor.128 
In order to establish jurisdiction under the ATCA, the plaintiffs 
must show that the claim has been brought by an alien and alleges a 
tort in violation of a United States treaty or the law of nations.129 
Clearly, the first requirement has been satisfied; the plaintiffs repre-
sent a class of more than 50,000 workers from China, the Philippines, 
Bangladesh, and Thailand.130 Moreover, the court, in determining 
whether a violation of the law of nations exists, should afford the 
plaintiffs' claim of debt bondage the same status as the forced labor 
claims in the Unocal cases.l3l As a result, debt bondage would consti-
tute a violation of:universal concern, eliminating any requirement for 
state action.132 In addition, U.S. retailers would be liable for these vio-
lations as long as they knowingly benefited from the debt bondage 
that existed in the factories and regardless of whether they directly 
engaged in the violation.133 
However, distinctions can be drawn between forced labor and 
debt bondage. For example, by definition, forced labor requires that 
the person has entered into work against her will.134 Conversely, debt 
bondage implies some degree of voluntary action by the person in 
initially accepting the work.135 Nonetheless, this distinction should not 
preclude jurisdiction under the ATCA.l36 The prohibitions of forced 
labor and slave-like practices such as debt bondage are now widely 
recognized in conjunction with slavery as customary international 
norms.137 In fact, most international instruments address the prohibi-
tions against these practices coterminously.138 Thus, such practices are 
128 See Greenhouse, supra note 125, at A9; Carlsen, supra note 125, at AI; Branigin, su-
pra note 125, at A14; Grant, supra note 125, at 3B. 
129 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
130 See Greenhouse, supra note 125, at A9; Carlsen, supra note 125, at AI; Branigin, su-
pranote 125, atAl4; Grant, supra note 125, at 3B. 
m See National Coalition Gov't v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 349 (C.D. Cal. 1997); 
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
132 See id.; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995); Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362,371 (E.D. La. 1997), afj'd, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999). 
133 See National Coalition Gov't, 176 F.R.D. at 349; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892. 
1M See Cleveland, supra note 5, at 1570. 
135 See id. at 1567-68. 
136 See id. at 1570. 
137 See id. 
138 See id. 
2000] Book Review 445 
prohibited regardless of whether the person voluntarily entered into 
the bonded condition or was forced into it.139 
While the plaintiffs' ability to establish jurisdiction under the 
ATCA is only speculative, their fate under a forum non conveniens ar-
gument has already been decided.l40 The defendant retailers and 
manufacturers claimed that an adequate alternative forum existed in 
Saipan.141 As a U.S. territory, the Commonwealth is also part of the 
U.S. federal court system.142 Consequently, United States law would 
continue to be applied to the case if it were removed to Saipan.143 
Moreover, the defendants argued that most of the witnesses and evi-
dence were located on the island.l44 However, the district judge, while 
ultimately transferring venue to federal court in Honolulu, Hawaii, 
rejected the defendants' argument.l45 The judge cited the potential 
difficulty in obtaining a fair and unbiased jury pool in Saipan, given 
the relatively small number of potential jurors and the extensive pre-
trial publicity in the pro-garment local press, as a basis for her deci-
sion.l46 On January 24,2000, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit denied the defendants' request without comment.147 Thus, the 
case will now proceed in Honolulu to determine jurisdiction under 
the ATCA.l48 
CONCLUSION 
In their book, Corporate Predators: The Hunt For Mega-Profits and 
The Attack on Democracy, Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman re-
count numerous instances of corporations placing concern for profits 
before people.149 In so doing, these corporations have committed 
egregious violations of human rights, labor rights, and environmental 
139 See Cleveland, supra note 5, at 1569-70. 
140 See Sweatslwp Watch: Summary of the Saipan Sweatslwp Litigation (visited May 15, 2000) 
<http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/ swatch/ marianas/ summary.html> [hereinafter Forum 
Non Conveniens Summary]. 
141 See Court Refuses to Move Suit from Honolulu to Saipan, AsSOCIATED PREss NEWSWIRES, 
Jan. 26, 2000, available in Westlaw, 1/26/00 APWIRES 21:23:00 [hereinafter Court Refuses to 
Move Suit]. 
142 See Trapped Report, supra note 10. 
143 See id. 
144 See Court Refuses to Move Suit, supra note 141. 
143 See Forum Non Conveniens Summary, supra note 140. 
146 See id. 
147 See Court Refuses to Move Suit, supra note 141. 
148 Seeid. 
149 See generaUy MOKHIBER & WEISSMAN, supra note 1. 
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rights in developing countries. ISO Due to the economic girth of trans- . 
national corporations, foreign and domestic governments have been 
unsuccessful or unwilling to require greater corporate accountabil-
ity.1S1 Thus, corporations have enjoyed a virtual freedom from liability 
for their abuses abroad,1s2 While Mokhiber and Weissman have edu-
cated their readers to these atrocities, they have failed to provide clear 
solutions for stopping the ill effects of globalization.1S3 However, evi-
dcmce suggests that activists need not solely rely on political leaders to 
affect change; rather, relief may be granted in the federal courts. 1M 
The Alien Tort Claims Act has increasingly been able to provide a fo-
rum for human rights claims and, more recently, for international 
labor violations. ISS As international norms continue to evolve, the 
ATCA should become an even more powerful weapon in compelling 
greater corporate accountability. 
150 See generally ill. 
151 See generally ill. 
152 See genera~ ill. 
15' See genera~ ill. 
154 See National Coalition Gov't v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 349 (C.D. Cal. 1997); 
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
155 See National Coalition Cov't, 176 F.R.D. at 349; Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892. 
